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THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA: 
OBJECTIONS TO THE 1980 DRAFT CONVENTION 
The international community has attempted the most 
ambitious treaty-making effort in history by trying to 
decide how the exploitation of the vast mineral wealth of 
the seas should be governed. The task has not been easy: 
countries with great differences in culture, politics, tech-
nology and geography have opposing viewpoints on the issues 
which must somehow be accomodated if agreement is to be 
reached. 
controversy over the resources of the oceans has 
emerged only in the recent past. In 1967, Ambassador Arvid 
Pardo of Malta put forth a proposal it the united Nations 
calling for an international agency to c. 'lersee the exploi-
tation of the seas. In a four hour speech the Ambassador 
electrified many Third World delegates by declaring that the 
immense mineral riches of the sea were the common heritage 
of mankind, to be used for the benefit of the less-developed 
countries of the world. 1 
The Ambassador's speech generated international inter-
est in the formation of a regime to exploit the sea-bed. 2 
The united Nations General Assembly created the Ad Hoc 
IStatement by Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta, November 1, 1967, 22 
GAOR, A/C.l/PV. 1515 and 1516 (1976). 
2Collins, Mineral Exploitation of the Seabed: Problems, Progress, 
and Alternatives, 11 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 599, 636 (1979) [hereinafter 
cited as Collins]. 
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Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the 
Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. 3 
This Ad Hoc Committee was replaced the following year by the 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean 
Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (the IISea-
Bed Commi ttee ll ) .4 The Sea-Bed Committee later became the 
preparatory body for the Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea (the II Conference II ).5 The Conference 
began in 1973 and, after nine sessions, has produced a Draft 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (the IIDraft convention ll ).6 
The Conference has been quite successful in reaching 
consensus over such IIdifficult political issues ll as fishing 
rights, transit passage of straits (with submerged transit 
and over-flight), mid-ocean archipelagoes, protection of the 
3G.A. Res. 2340, 22 GAOR Supp. 16 A/6/76, at 14 (1968). 
4 G.A. Res. 2467 A, 23 GAOR Supp. 18 A/7218, at 15 (1969). 
5The First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea met in 
1958 with 86 States participating. Four international conventions were 
produced. They cover the territorial seas and contiguous zone, the high 
seas, fishing and conservation of the living resources of the high seas 
and continental shelf. 
A second Conference was called by the General Assembly in Geneva in 
1960 to seek to resolve disagreements over the breadth of the terri-
torial sea and fishery limits. However, the 82 States represented were 
unable to adopt any substantive proposal on these matters. 
United Nations Press Release SEA/18, 28 May 1974. 
6The Draft Convention is the most current draft treaty which the 
Conference has produced: see,~, Informal Single Negotiating Text 
(ISNT), U.N.Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8 (1975); Revised Single Negotiating Text 
(RSNT) , U.N.Doc. A/CONG.62/WP.8/Rev. 1 (1976); Informal Composite Nego-
tiating Text (ICNT), U.N .Doc. A/CONF. 62/ WP .10 (1977). The ICNT was 
again revised in 1980. See U.N.Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP.10/Rev.2 (1980. The 
Draft Convention on the L~of the Sea is the third revision of the 1977 
ICNT. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP.10/Rev.3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 
the Dra~Conventionl. 
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marine environment and dispute settlement.? It was thought 
that agreement had finally been reached and codified in an 
acceptable form in the Draft convention. 8 However, shortly 
after taking office in 1981, President Reagan announced that 
an inter-agency re-examination of the, Convention had turned 
up serious problems necessitating a thorough review. 9 That 
review was completed with the announcement on January 29, 
1982 that the President had decided to send negotiators to 
the March 8th Conference sessions to work with other coun-
tries to achieve an acceptable treaty for the world's 
oceans. 10 
7Moore, In Search of Common Nodules at UNCLOS III, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 
1,2 (1977). 
8Ambassador Elliot Richardso~ at the close of the 1980 summer session 
said, 
Historians are likely to look at the ninth session of the 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, just 
concluding here in Geneva today, as the most significant 
single event in' the history of peaceful cooperation and the 
development of the rule of law since the founding of the 
United Nations itself. When this session of the Conference 
resumed some 5 weeks ago it faced a number of basic outstand-
ing issues. Almost all of these have been resolved in a 
manner commanding the broad support of the Conference partici-
pants. It is now all but certain that the text of a Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea will be ready for signature in 
1981. 
Statement by Ambassador-at-Large Elliot Richardson, Special Repre-
sentative of the President for the Law of the Sea Conference, Geneva, 
August 29, 1980. 
9New York Times, March 4, 1981, at 1 col. 5. 
ID The statement released by the President said: 
I am announcing today that the United States will return to 
those negotiations and work with other countries to achieve an 
acceptable treaty. In the deep sea -bed mining area, we will 
72 
The current Conference session, scheduled to end 
April 30, has, as of this date, reached a deadlock over U.S. 
demands for changes in the deep sea-bed mining provisions. 
The Reagan Administration has proposed over 230 amendments 
which have been rejected by the "Group of 77" developing 
countries. The amendments were rejected on the grounds that 
"they called into question fundamental elements of the 
treaty already worked out in the negotiations."ll 
(footnote 10 continued) 
seek changes necessary to correct those unacceptable elements 
and to achieve the goal of a treaty that: 
will not deter development of any deep sea-bed mineral 
resources to meet national and world demand; 
will assure national access to these resources by current 
and future qualified entities to enhance U. S. security of 
supply, to avoid monopolization of the resources by the 
operating arm of the International Authority, and to pro-
mote the economic development of the resources; 
will provide a deCision-making role in the deep seabed 
regime that fairly reflects and effectively protects the 
political and economic interests and financial contribu-
tions of participating states; 
will not allow for amendments to come into force without 
approval of the participating states, including in our 
case, the advice and consent of the Senate; 
will not set other undesirable precedents for international 
organizations; and 
will be likely to receive the advice and consent of the 
Senate. In this regard, the convention should not contain 
provisions for the mandatory transfer of private technology 
and participation by and funding for national liberation 
movements. 
Statement by President Reagan, January 29, 1982. See also The Boston 
Globe, January 30, 1982, at 4 col.2. 
IlA "Group of 11" Western countries have offered alternatives to the 
U.S. amendments. The Boston Globe, April 4, 1982, at 15 col.l. 
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The Conference is stalled by u.s. demands for changes 
in the chapter that would regulate the mining of important 
minerals from the world's sea-beds. These minerals consist 
of tons of potato-sized rocks, or "nodules," lying on the 
ocean floor. 12 These nodules were first discovered in 
December 1872 by the H.M.S. Challenger, a wooden steamship 
from the University of Edinburgh on an expedition to explore 
the world seas. "One of the major discoveries of the Chal-
lenger was that nodules of rocklike materials . lay on 
the deepest bottoms of the Atlantic, the Indian and particu-
larly the Pacific Oceans.,,13 
The nodules14 contain four minerals which industry 
sources believe would make deep-sea mining commercially 
prc.fi table. These minerals, manganese, copper, nickel and 
cobalt,15 have important strategic uses for which, in some 
cases, there is no substitute. 16 
12"The nodules constitute a huge resource, aggregating 1.7 billion 
tons and containing 400 billion tons of manganese, 16.4 billion tons of 
nickel, 8.8 billion tons of copper and 9.18 billion tons of cobalt." 
McKelvey & Wang, World Subsea Mineral Resources, Department of the 
Interior, u.S. Geological Survey (1969). 
13R. ECKERT, THE ENCLOSURE OF OCEAN RESOURCES, 214, (1979) [herein-
after cited as ECKERT]. 
14Why these geologically ancient nodules are always seen on the top 
of the ocean floor and are never covered by sediment remains a mystery. 
Id. at 217. 
15 See generally, Note by the Chairman of the First Seabed Committee, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.2. 
16Manganese is used in dry cell batteries but its most important 
application is in the making of steel where it adds strength or removes 
impurities, depending on the process used. 
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The General Services Administration has classified 
these metals as "cri tical materials, II illustrating their 
importance to the American economy.17 united States' access 
to these minerals is strategically important, as this coun-
try imports virtually all of the manganese and cobalt it 
uses, 77 percent of its nickel requirements and as much as 
20 percent of the necessary copper. 18 It has been estimated 
that one mining site could provide a quarter of the require-
ments of the United States for these materials. 19 In addi-
tion, it is predicted that land-based supplies of manganese 
will be depleted in 98 years, copper in 55, nickel in 148 
(footnote 16 continued) 
Nickel is also used in the manufacture of stainless steel, alloys 
and for electroplating. Nickel imparts certain properties to alloys, 
such as an increase in strength and resistance to corrosion, that cannot 
be economically obtained by other means. 
Cobalt is an expensive metal with a relatively small market. It is 
used in a variety of industrial products, both metallic and non-metallic. 
The principal characteristic of the metal is its resistance to high 
temperatures which makes it particularly well-suited to a number of 
rapidly expanding advanced technology industries. 
E-lectrical conductivity and resistance to corrosion make copper 
invaluable in the manufacture of electrical equipment, cables and wires 
for communication and electrical transmission lines, electrical appli-
ances, tubing and sheeting for the construction and chemical industries, 
alloys and in a number of other uses. 
See Economic Implications of Sea-Bed Mineral Development in the 
International Area: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 
62/25 at 34 (1974) [hereinafter cited as The Secretary-General's Report]. 
17Arrow, The Proposed Regime for the Unilateral Exploitation of Deep 
Seabed Mineral Resources by the United States, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 337, 
341 (1980). 
18Gillis, Exploration for and Exploitation of Deep Seabed Hard Mine-
ral Resources: A Deep Seabed Mining Industry Perspective, in PROCEEDINGS 
OF CONFERENCE ON DEEP SEABED MINING AND FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 44 (F. Chen 
ed. 1981) [hereinafter citeo as Gillis]. 
19Collins, supra note 2, at 606. 
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and cobalt in 146. 20 
Because these mineral's are so "critical" to the U. S. 
economy, the Reagan Administration has examined the Draft 
convention very carefully. This paper will examine the 
major Reagan objections to the Draft Convention against the 
background of the current international legal status of 
these resources of the sea-bed. It will be argued in Part I 
that under international law, both customary and conven-
tional, these resources are open to unilateral exp.loitation 
on a first-come, first-served basis. United Nations resolu-
tions to the contrary have no binding legal effect. Part II 
will explain the international regime and its component 
parts as set forth in the Draft Convention; Part III will 
discuss the Reagan objections. Part IV will argue against 
unilateral exploitation of the sea-bed and in favor of a law 
of the sea tre<lty while Part V will summarize the various 
issues discussed. 
I. LEGAL STATUS OF SEABED NODULES 
The legal status of these minerals under international 
law is in dispute. Evidence of the present state of the law 
may be found in the Convention on the High Seas of April 29, 
1958 (the "High Seas Convention" )21 and in international 
customary law. 
20Id . at 610. 
21Convention on the High Seas of April 20, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 
U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter cited as High Seas Convention]. 
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Article 2 of the High Seas convention22 lists four 
, freedoms of the high seas, but states that the list is not 
meant to be complete or exclusionary but instead that "addi-
tional uses of the high seas, which do not interfere with 
the reasonable use of the high seas by others, are protected 
freedoms. 11 23 
Can the exploitation of the deep sea-bed be considered 
one of these unnamed but protected freedoms? An investiga-
tion of the legislative intent of Article 2 would make it 
appear so. The International Law Commission in its commen-
tary on Artic:t.e 2 stated, liThe list of freedoms of the high 
seas contained in this article is not restricti ve; the 
commission has merely specified four of the main freedoms. 
It is aware that there are other freedoms, such as freedom 
to explore or exploit the subsoil of the high seas . 
Exploitation of the sea-bed was again mentioned a year 
later in a 19"56 report25 to the General Assembly: liThe 
I Commission has not made specific mention of the freedom to 
explore or exploit the subsoil of the high seas. It con-
sidered that . . . such exploitation has not yet assumed 
sufficient practical importance to justify special regula-
tion." 
22Id . at Article 2. 
23Gillis, supra note 20, at 50. 
2~eport of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 
10 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.9), 3, U.N. Doc. A/2934 (1956). 
25Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 
11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.10), 24, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956). 
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Some scholars have argued that sea-bed exploitation 
should not be considered a freedom of the high seas because 
in 1958 such exploitation was deemed to be quite far in the 
future. When it became a reality, "special regulation" 
would be needed and that, it is urged, is the purpose of the 
present conference. 26 
Yet it is possible that "special regulation" meant 
simply the enumeration of that freedom, like the other four 
in the treaty, when it became practical to do so. The fact 
that mining was technologically impossible when the High 
Seas Convention was drafted does not preclude States from 
recognizing future rights to mine when it becomes feasible. 
Legal scholars have also argued that deep-sea mining is 
a freedom allowed by international customary law. Interna-
tional customary law has been defined by Chief Justice 
Marshall of the united States Supreme Court as the "usage of 
nations [which] becomes law and that whic~ is an established 
rule of practice is a rule of law. 1I27 Therefore the ques-
tion of the legality of sea-bed mining may be answered by , 
looking to State practice in the past. such State practice 
must be a custom followed by States because they believe 
they are legally required to do so.28 
26Collins, supra note 2, at 634. 
27United States v. Percheman, 7 Peters 51 (1833), reprinted in 
Collins, supra note 2, at 615. 
28SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (5th ed., 1967) 
[hereinafter cited as SCHWARZENBERGER]. 
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The legality of mining has only been questioned recent-
ly. But, 
there is no room for dispute that as a matter of customary 
law the resources of the sea-bed have been open for explora-
tion and exploitation. Since time-out-of-mind oysters and 
shank, sponge and coral, pearls, coal and sand have b~en 
extracte29 and removed from the technologically accessible 
sea-bed. 
The general rule regarding sea-bed exploitation, which has 
survived for 400 years, has been that ocean resources may be 
appropriated as long as no claim of sovereignty to the deep 
ocean floor or the water column above it is made. 30 
Ownership of these resources has traditionally been 
based upon the ancient Roman concept of ~ nUllius, meaning 
1/ [t]he property of nobody. A thing which has no owner. 1/31 
Ownership of an object which was res nullius was originally 
acquired by occupancy, that is, by taking possession of 
it. 32 To acquire o,wnership by occupancy, four conditions 
needed to be met: 
1. The thing must be a res nullius, a thing which never 
had an owner or which has been abandoned; 
2. It must be a thing which is capable of ownership, that 
is, res in commercio; 
3. It must be brought into tlie actual possession or 
control of the aspiring owner; and 
29G· ll · 1 1S, supra note 18, at 49. 
30ECKERT, supra note 13, at 3. 
31BLACK 'S LAW DICTIONARY 1470 (4th ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as 
BLACK'S]. 
32STEPHENSON, A HISTORY OF ROMAN LAW 385 (1912) [hereinafter cited as 
STEPHENSON]. 
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4. The person must acquire it with the intention of 
assuming ~ership in it -- that is, possession must be 
juridical. 
Acquisi tion of ownership by occupancy was applied by 
the Romans to six categories of things: (1) wild beasts, 
birds, fishes, etc., (2) precious stones in a state of 
nature, (3) things captured in war, (4) abandoned property, 
(5) things found on the sea shore, and (6) islands found in 
the sea. 34 
Precious stones and objects washed up by the sea would 
seem to be conceptually very close to nodules, as they may 
both be reduced to ownership by capture. However, as these 
precious stones and objects would be found on land or in 
shallow water, a closer analogy might be made to islands 
which, like nodules, are found on the high seas. "When an 
island rises in the sea, though this rarely happens, it 
belongs to the first occupant, for until occupied, it is 
held to belong to no one. 1I35 Like islands, the nodules are 
created by geological processes on the high seas beyond any 
states' territorial sea. The nodules would, therefore, 
belong to the first finder who reduced them to his own 
possession. 
It is often argued by less-developed countries which 
lack the requisite mining technology that the nodules are 
not res nullius but res communes or things common to all. 
33Id . 
34Id . at 386. 
35THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN (3rd ed. J. Moyle trans. 1896). 
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Res communes are "those things which are used and enjoyed by 
everyone, even in single parts, but can never be exclusively 
acquired as a whole. 11 36 It has also been said that res com-
munes are those things having "a money value which is merely 
incapable of appropriation to individuals."37 Examples usu-
ally given are air and light. 38 Clearly under these defini-
tions nodules could not be classified as res communes, as one 
could easily sell a nodule and receive the value of its mine-
rals in dollars. The same could not be said of air or light. 
The doctrine of res communes has been used to explain 
the meaning of the ambiguous Declaration of Principles 
Resolution 2740 (XXV) which was passed by the General Assem-
bly in 1970 by a vote of 108 to 0 with 14 abstentions. 
This Resolution states that the sea-bed, ocean floor and the 
resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind. 39 
36 BLACK'S, supra note 31, at 1469. 
37 BUCKLAND , THE MAIN INSTITUTIONS OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 91 (1931). 
38 BLACK'S, supra note 31, at 1469. 
39The Declaration of Principles Resolution states: 
1. The seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof beyond 
the limits of natural jurisdiction ... as well as the resources 
of the area, are the common heritage of mankind. 
2. The area shall not be subject to appropriation by any means 
by States or persons, natural or juridical, and no State shall 
claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any 
part thereof. 
7. The exploration of the area and the exploitation of its 
resources shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a 
whole ... and taking into particular consideration the interests 
and needs of the developing countries .... " 
G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8097 (1970). 
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What this means has never been made clear. Neither the 
Resolution nor any of the preparatory works defines the 
phrase. 40 Arvid Pardo, who coined the term, has claimed it 
is a new basic concept which he wishes to introduce into 
international law. 41 Dr. Pardo has asserted that the prin-
ciple of the common heritage of mankind goes beyond the 
concept of res communes by giving the deep sea-bed a IIspe-
cial status. II Because of this status, the area II should be 
reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes and administered 
by an international agency in the name and for the benefit 
of all peoples of present and future generations. 1I42 
No one argues that the sea should not be preserved from 
the military competition evident elsewhere. It would also 
seem to be conceded by governments if not by the mining 
industry, that at least some of the benefits of the deep-sea 
should be equitably shared. 
said in 1966: 
As President Lyndon Johnson 
[u]nder no circumstances . . . must we ever allow the pros-
pects of rich harvest and mineral wealth to create a new 
form of colonial competition among the maritime nations. We 
must be careful to avoid a race to grab and to hold the 
lands under the high seas. We must ensure that the deep 
seas and the4~ean bottom are, and remain the legacy of all 
human beings. 
40Collins, supra note 2, at 643. 
41pardo, An International Regime for the Deep Seabed: Developing Law 
~r Developing Anarchy?, 5 TEX. INT'L L. F. 204, 214 (1969) [hereinaf~er 
cited as Pardo]. 
42 U.N. Doc. A/AC135/W.6.1./S.R.2 (July-August 1968), reprinted in 
Pardo, supra note 41, at 214. 
43 See generally, WENK, THE POLITICS OF THE OCEAN 212-213, 258, 475-77 
(1972) . 
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Disagreement arises over the type of international 
agency to be created and the extent of its control over 
exploitation. Less-developed countries, afraid that the 
technologically advanced States might begin unilateral 
exploitation of the sea-bed before thi~ international agency 
was even established, passed in the U.N. what has become 
known as the Moratorium Resolution 2574 (XXIV) of Decem-
ber 14, 1969. This Resolution purported to prohibit any 
exploitation of the sea-bed or recognition of any claim to 
its resources pending the establishment of an international 
regime by the conference. 44 This Resolution was passed over 
the fierce opposition45 of the developed nations and cut 
44The Moratorium Resolution states: 
Pending the establishment of the aforementioned international 
regime: (a) States and persons, physical or juridical, are 
bound to refrain from all activities of exploitation of the 
resources of the area of the seabed and ocean floor and sub-
soil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; 
(b) no claim to any part of that area or its resources shall 
be recognized. 
G.A.Res. 2574, U.N. Doc. A/Pv. 1833 (1969). 
45Immediately before the Resolution vote, the U.S. delegate stated: 
[Ilt would be a serious regression from the progress we have 
made so far, if the United Nations were now to signal that it 
is willing to make fundamental decisions in sea-bed issues 
through a politics of confrontation and paper majorities. 
Such a signal can only undermine that foundation of national 
confidence upon which the United Nations work on the sea-bed 
must proceed if it is to come to anything. We earnestly sug-
gest, therefore, that the interests of all of us concerned 
with this important work would be far better served by the 
rejection of the present draft resolution. 
Explanatory Statement of Votes on the Moratorium Resolution, 24 GAOR, 
A/PV.1833, at 3 (1969). 
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across traditional East-West voting patterns. 46 The results 
of the vote reflected the developing split between those 
poor nations (generally in the southern hemisphere) which 
lack the requisite mining technology or the resources to 
obtain it, and the advanced nations of the North. 
The American position on the Moratorium Resolution and 
on the meaning of the common heritage principle has been 
consistent: both lack binding legal effect. 47 • The United 
states believes that the significance of the common heritage 
of mankind principle will have to be decided at the Confer-
ence. Until that time, "deep sea-bed resources may be 
recovered lawfully by any State or its nationals as an exer-
46The Moratorium Resolution was passed 62 to 28 with 28 abstentions. 
Those States voting against or abstaining included such unlikely bed 
fellows as Australia, Canada, China, France, Israel, Japan, Libya, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, the USSR, the UK and the US. Id. 
47The United States position on the Moratorium Resolution and on the 
Declaration of Principles Resolution has been stated as follows: 
The Executive Branch continues to· hold the view that deep 
sea-bed mineral exploitation constitutes a reasonable use of 
the high seas and is presently permitted under international 
law. We have made this position clear to other nations on 
many occasions. In this connection, the United States has 
repeatedly expressed its position that the so-called morator-
ium resolution is without binding legal effect. Some st~tes 
have suggested that it is possible to interpret the [Delcara-
tion of Principles Resolution] as legally prohibiting the 
exploitation of the deep sea-bed until the new international 
regime and machinery for that exploitation comes into effect. 
These states derive this interpretation from their understand-
ing of the common heritage of mankind concept. The United 
States, however, has consistently maintained that its interpre-
tation of the "Declaration of Principles" does not permit the 
derivation of a "moratorium effect" from this resolution. 
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
Sub. Comm. on Minerals, Materials and Fuels 944 (1974). 
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cise of a traditional high seas freedom.,,48 
Third World countries to the contrary argue that the 
1970 Declaration of Principles Resolution is declaratory of 
an existing principle of international law in the sense that 
the United Nations vote expresses a consensus of the inter-
national community.49 However, General Assembly resolutions 
clearly have no legally binding effect in and of themselves. 50 
It is also doubtful whether either of these resolutions can 
be seen as evidence of general state practice and so consti-
tute a rule of international customary law, especially in 
light of the objections to them by the industrialized 
States. 51 
Thus, under the current state of the law, exploitation 
of the sea-bed can be justified both under the international 
customary law. theory of res nullius and under the High Seas 
48Richardson, The United States and the Current Status of Deep Seabed 
Minin at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 11 
ENVT'L L. 193, 196 (1981) hereinafter cited as Richardson. 
49Carias, Seabed Mining in the Informal 1980 Draft Convention of the 
Law of the Sea, in PROCEEDINGS OF CONFERENCE ON DEEP SEABED MINING AND 
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 32, 36 (F. Chen ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as 
Carias] . 
50"Whatever political or moral force such recommendations of the 
General Assembly may claim, they are not legally binding." 
~.CHWARZENBERGER, supra note 28, at 289. 
51Due to the demise of the colonial system and the large number 
of now independent states which have joined the United Nations 
it would theoretically be possible to "assemble a majority in 
the General Assembly that would represent as little as 4.7% of 
the world's population [and] 1.3% of gross world product." 
Weaver, Making the United Nations Safe for Democracy, FORTUNE, Nov., 
1975 at 194. 
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convention. U.N. resolutions attempting to limit or define 
these freedoms are without binding legal effect. 
II. THE REGIME ESTABLISHED BY THE DRAFT CONVENTION 
It is necessary at the outset for one to have an under-
standing of the international regime for the deep-sea and 
its component parts created by the Draft Convention. The 
Convention would create an International Sea-Bed Authority 
( . II h . II ) h h d ld b' . 52 the Aut or1ty w ose ea quarters wou e 1n Jama1ca. 
All States which are parties to the Convention would auto-
matically be members of the Authority. The principal organs 
of the Authority would be the Assembly, the Council and the 
Secretariat. 53 In addition, the operative arm of the Author-
ity, the Enterprise, would be created which would undertake 
mining activities in the Area. 54 
The Assembly would consist of all members of the Author-
i ty and each member would have one vote. 55 As the only 
component of the Authority which would consist of all the 
members, the Assembly would be considered the supreme, 
law-making organ of the Authority to which the other princi-
pal organs would be accountable. 56 
The Council would be made up of thirty-six members of 
52Draft Convention, supra note 6, at Article 156. 
53Id . at Article 158. 
54The area is defined as "the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil 
thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." Id. at Article 1. 
55 Id . at Article 159(5). 
56Id . at Article 160(1). 
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the Authority, elected by the Assembly.57 The Council would 
be the executive organ of the Authority and would generally 
be charged with carrying out the policies of the Author-
ity.58 The Council would also approve plans of work (con-
tracts) in accordance with Article 6 of Annex I II 59 and in 
accordance with Article 162 (n) of the Draft Convention. 60 
Two organs of the Council would also be established: the 
Legal and Technical Conunission and the Economic Planning 
Conunission. 6l 
The Economic Planning conunission would be responsible 
for submitting to the Assembly a system of compensation for 
developing States suffering adverse effects from mining in 
the area. 62 The Legal and Technical conunission would review 
written plans of work and make reconunendations to the Coun-
cil. 63 
The Secretariat would consist of a Secretary-General 
and such staff as the Authority would require. The Secre-
tary-General would be the chief administrative officer of 
the Authority.64 
57 Id . at Article 161. 
58Id . at Article 162(1) . 
59 Id . at Annex III, Article 6. 
60Id . at Article 162(n). 
61 Id . at Article 163(1)(a) and (b) . 
62Id . at Article 164(2)(d) . 
63Id . at Article 165(2). 
64Id . at Article 166. 
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The system of exploitation now embodied in the Draft 
Convention is the result of a compromise proposed by the 
. d b dId d d I . . 65 Un1te States etween eve ope an eve op1ng countr1es. 
The former viewed any sort of international mining regime 
wi th great suspicion and wished to keep the sea open for 
exploitation by private companies. The latter greatly 
feared a new colonization of the sea-bed by the advanced 
states and sought to allow only deep-sea mining by the 
proposed international regime. Under the so-called parallel 
system of exploitation, a mining company would be required 
to prospect an area large enough to sustain two mine sites. 
The Authority would then decide which site to reserve for 
its own use. Activities in the area would be carried out by 
either the Enterprise, states Parties or by natural or 
juridical persons in association with the Authority. Acti-
vities in the area would be carried out in accordance with a 
formal written plan of work which every applicant would be 
required to submit. The plans of work would take the form 
of a contract when approved. 66 
The Draft Convention would also create a Sea-Bed Dis-
putes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of 
the sea. 67 The Chamber would have jurisdiction over dis-
65 Support for a parallel system of exploitation was expressed in a 
major speech by Dr. Henry Kissinger, the U.S. Secretary of State, de-
livered in New York in July of 1976. 
Carias, supra note 49, at 33. 
66Draft Convention, supra note 6, at Article 153(3). 
67 Id . at Articles 186-191. 
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putes between states, between a state and the Authority and, 
in certain instances, between parties to a contract whether 
they be states, the Authority, the Enterprise, State enti-
ties and natural or juridical persons. 68 
III. ADMINISTRATION OBJECTIONS TO THE DRAFT CONVENTION 
The Reagan Administration has been criticized for 
conducting a policy review at such a late stage in the 
negotiations. 69 However, any treaty to take effect must 
obtain the advice and consent of the Senate. In its present 
form, it is highly doubtful the Convention would receive 
such consent. 70 
James Malone, Chairman of the u. S. delegation to the 
Conference, has voiced concern over several provisions which 
might prevent Senate ratification. These areas of concern 
include: (a) the transfer of technology, (b) the lack of 
assured' access to mining sites for American companies and 
the fear that the international regime created by the treaty 
may eventually monopolize production, (c) the lack of a 
68The 'Chamber has jurisdiction in disputes between parties to a 
contract concerning the interpretation or application of a contract or 
plan of work and acts or omissions of a party to a contract directed to 
the other party or directly affecting its legitimate interests. 
Yd. at Article 187. 
69New York Times, March 18, 1981 at A26, col.3. 
70"[It] is the best judgment of this Administration that this Draft 
Convention would not obtain the advice and consent of the Senate." 
Statement by James Malone, Chairman of US Delegation to Law of the Sea 
C9nference, before the House Subcommittee on Oceanography on April 28, 
1981 in DEP'T ST. BULL. 48,49 (July 1981) [hereinafter cited as THE 
BULLETIN]. 
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guaranteed seat on the Council for the united states, (d) 
the review conference and the fear of treaty amendments over 
the objection of the Senate, (e) the production limitations, 
(f) the lack of judicial review over Authority decisions, 
d ( ) h ' , 'l'b' t 71 an g t e prOV1.S1.ons concern1.ng 1. erat1.on movemen s. 
A. The Mandatory Transfer of Technology Provisions 
The mining industry and the u.S. Administration strong-
ly object to the provisions of Article 14472 regarding the 
transfer of technology. Under this article, the Authority 
would be called upon to take measures to promote and encour-
age the transfer of mining technology and scientific know-
ledge to developing states. Programs would be developed for 
the transfer of technology to the Enterprise and developing 
states including, inter alia, increasing the access of the 
Enterprise and of developing States to the relevant tech-
nology under fair and reasonable terms and conditions. 
When applying for a contract to mine a site, the pro-
spective miner would have to agree to transfer to the Enter-
prise technology which he planned to use (and which in the 
future is actually used) 73 should the Enterprise determine 
that it is unavailable on the open market. 74 A miner could 
use the technology of a third party only if that party agreed 
72Draft Convention, supra note 6, 
73Id , at Annex III, Article 5, 
74Id , at Annex III, Article 5(3)(a) , 
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to the transfer under fair and reasonable commercial terms. 
Only technology which could be transferred would be used; if 
the Enterprise sought the technology of a third party (which 
had been transferred to the miner) and that party refused, 
the miner would be precluded from using it. 75 
If the Enterprise invoked the transfer obligation, it 
could do so only under fair and reasonable commercial terms 
and conditions. 76 The obligation to transfer would expire 
ten years after the Enterprise began commercial production. 77 
Despite strong American opposition, the so-called 
"Brazil clause" was incorporated into the Convention. 78 
This clause would permit developing countries to take advan-
tage of these technology transfer provisions in the event 
that the Enterprise decided not to mine a certain site and 
turned it over to a less-developed country. This clause 
would only apply to exploitation of the reserved sites. 
Al though there 
technology transfer 
are provisions 
d ' t 79 th l.spU es, e 
75 Id . at Annex III, Article 5(3)(b). 
for the settlement of 
u. S. mining industry 
76However, as one congressman has stated, "[alnytime you force some-
one to sell something, that person is at a serious disadvantage," Inter-
view with Rep. John Breaux, New York Times, March 15, 1981, at E5, col.3. 
77But note possibility of treaty amendments over Senate objections, 
78Richardson, supra note 48, at 204. 
790ne mining industry representative has called the dispute settle-
ment procedures "meaningless." While the Draft Convention would provide 
for binding arbitration under present United Nations arbitration rules, 




Ufeels the neutrality of arbitrators on any aspect of the 
dispute settlement procedures is very doubtful, especially 
when asked to determine what are fair and reasonable commer-
cial terms and conditions. u80 
The arbitrator's neutrality is questionable due to the 
method of selection. Each party would nominate one arbitra-
tor; the remaining three would be chosen by both parties 
from a list composed of four names from each member state. 81 
If the parties could not agree on three names, as would seem 
likely, the President of the Law of the Sea Tribunal would 
appoint three arbitrators from the list. 82 The President 
would be chosen by the Assembly which, due to its one-nation, 
one-vote structure, would contain an automatic maj ori ty of 
developing states. The result would be "an Eastern European 
Socialist or developing State President selecting three out 
of five arbitrators from a list of nominees suggested for 
(footnote 79 continued) 
No arbitration panel could interpret the treaty provisions; that 
would be a question for the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber (the "Chamber"). 
However, the Chamber could not question the Authority's discretionary 
powers, nor could it declare any rules, regulations or procedures 
adopted by the Authority invalid. The mining industry feels these 
limitations on the judiciary would be at best irrelevant because the 
Chamber could only be expected "to reflect the overwhelming majority of 
third-world votes plus Soviet bloc votes in the Assembly and thus to be 
thoroughly biased against the private miner." 
llil. 
Ely, One OPEC Is Enough!, 5 REG. 19,23 (1981 [hereinafter cited as 
80Gillis, supra note 18, at 61. 
81The Draft Convention, supra note 6, at Annex VI, Article 3(9). 
82Id . at Annex VI, Article 3(3). 
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the most part by the developing States. ,,83 Private miners 
would be reluctant to commit substantial sums of money and 
sea-bed technology under these conditions. 
At the heart of the technology transfer dispute is the 
miner's fear that such technology transfer terms are "ano-
ther effective means for a developing-state dominated Author-
i ty to control the entry of industrialized states into 
seabed mining acti vi ties. ,,84 A state or private company's 
mining activities in the non-reserved area could be directly 
prohibited by the revocation of the contract of a miner who 
refused to transfer his technology. 85 The Enterprise, in 
addition to other advantages,86 would receive the benefit of 
any new technological breakthroughs owned by any of the 
private miners,87 thus indirectly increasing the likelihood 
of creating an Enterprise monopoly. 
B. The Question of Assured Access to Sea-Bed Resources 
The uncertainty surrounding the question of assured 
access is a major objection of the mining industry and of 
83Gillis, supra note 18, at 65. 
84Id . at 61. 
85Ely , supra note 79, at 21. 
86The Enterprise would receive its prospected sites at no cost with 
each contract application. The Enterprise would be furnished with 
sufficient start-up capital to exploit one site (worth approximately 
1.25 billion dollars). The Enterprise could also be exempted from the 
fees levied on private miners by an Assembly vote. In addition, the 
Enterprise would be authorized to negotiate with the countries in which 
it operated for tax-exempt status. 
Id. at 24. 
87Id . 
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the U.S. government to the current Draft Convention. Com-
mercial miners believe that through transfer of technology 
provisions, production limitations and other means discussed 
later, developing countries may monopolize deep-sea mining. 
One former U.S. ambassador to the Conference has stated, "I 
am afraid what was negotiated was to give an Enterprise to 
the Group of 77 on one side of the system, and not to have 
clear assured access on the other, but to have some rather 
significant ambiguity about the access on our side of the 
system. ,,88 
A crucial aspect of the question of assured access 
which would not threaten U.S. interests is the contract 
approval process. This process would begin in the Legal and 
Technical Commission (the "Commission") which would deter-
mine if the applicant and his plan of work complied with the 
requisite criteria. 89 The Commission would then make a 
recommendation to the Council. 
The Administration has questioned whether a qualified 
U.S. mining company could be unreasonably denied or delayed 
access by the Commission. It has been stated that "the 
issuance of contracts to industrialized States could be 
easily stopped or controlled to exercise leverage and force 
adhesive contract terms.,,90 The Administration has argued 
88Moore, The Law of the Sea Negotiations and the Struggle for Law, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF CONFERENCE ON DEEP SEABED MINING AND FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 
21, 27 (F. Chen ed, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Moore]. 
89Richardson, supra note 48, at 199. 
90G'll' 18 63 ~ ~s, supra note ,at . 
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that should the Commission recommend against granting a 
contract to an otherwise qualified u.s. company, it would be 
difficul t for the U. s. to overturn the decision. A three-
fourths vote of the Council would be required to override 
Commission recommendations and, due to the seating arrange-
ment provisions discussed later, the soviet Unton, her 
allies, and developing states would be guaranteed eleven 
Council seats -- an effective veto. 91 
This veto would only exist, however, when attempting to 
overturn commission recommendations. Two issues regarding 
the commission thus become important: the selection process 
for Commission members and the voting procedures in the 
Commission. commission members would be chosen by a three-
fourths vote of the Council; a biased Commission would thus 
be possible only if twenty~seven out of the thirty-six 
members so voted, an unlikely occurence. In addition, 
although the voting procedures have yet to be established by 
the Preparatory Commission, the U. s. representative will 
lIinsist that this ... be no more than a simple majority.,,92 
Moreover, even if the Council were to reject a Commission 
recommendation (e.g., in favor of a qualified u.s. company) 
and a conciliation could not be reached,. the plan would be 
deemed approved unless rejected by consensus or by the 
absence of formal objections. 93 
9I ld . at 59. 
92Richardson, supra note 48, at 200. 
93Gillis, supra note 18, at 63. 
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Thus, although other aspects of the Convention could 
effectively deny industrialized States access to the sea-
bed, the ~ontract approval process would not. The contract 
approval process has been described as II fair, clear and 
well-nigh automatic II ; 94 the system could only be distorted 
lIif three-fourths of the members of the Council made a cons-
cious and determined effort to elect unsuitable Commission 
members who would ignore the requirements of the treaty. 11 95 
C. Council Seating Arrangements 
A related stumbling block to Administration approval of 
the Convention is the lack,of an assured seat for the United 
States on the Council. tn the Council, the Soviet union and 
its allies would have three guaranteed seats, but the United 
States would be required to IIcompete with its allies for any 
representation. 11 96 
Under a complex system designed to protect all the 
various interest groups, elections to the thirty-six member 
council would take place in the following order: (a) four 
out of those eight States IIwhich have the largest invest-
ments in preparation for and in the conduct of activities in 
the area. II (One of these four must be from the Eastern 
Socialist European region);97 (b) four members who are 
major consumers or importers of the metals involved and lIin 
94Richardson, supra note 48, at 199. 
95Id . at 200. 
96 THE BULLETIN, supra note 70, at 49. 
97Draft Convention, supra note 6, at Article 161(1)(a). 
96 
• 
any case one state from the Eastern Socialist European 
region"j98 (c) four members who are major exporters of area 
minerals including at least two developing countries whose 
economies rely a great deal on these mineral exports; 99 
(d) six less-developed countries representing special inter-
ests,100 and (e) eighteen members elected to ensure "an 
equitable geographical distribution of seats in the Council 
as a whole." Each geographical region elects at least one 
member under this provision. The five relevant geographical 
regions are Africa, Asia, Eastern Socialist Europe, Latin 
America, and western Europe and others. 101 
Under these seating arrangements it is true that most 
of the time the united States would have a seat. Yet the 
uni ted States would not be considered a geographical area 
but rather part of "Western Europe and others." Article 
161(4) states that "due regard should be paid to the desir-
ability of rotating seats.,,102 Thus, eventually "the prin-
ciple of rotation could still apply to rotate us [the U.S.] 
off at some time in the future.,,103 By contrast, the Soviet 
98Id . at Article 161(1)(b). 
99 Id . at Article 161(1)(c). 
100The special interests include those of States with large popula-
tions, States which are land-locked or geographically-disadvantaged, 
States which are the major importers of area minerals, States which are 
potential producers of such minerals and least developed States. 
Id. at Article 161(d). 
101Id . at Article 161(1)(e). 
102Id . at Article 161(4). 
103 Moore, supra note 88, at 28. 
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union and its allies would be guaranteed three permanent 
seats while developing states would receive eight. 
The Reagan Administration believes that the United 
states, as the largest technological maritime state, should 
be given an assured seat on the Council. As Ambassador 
Pardo recognized in 1969, no major maritime state could sign 
a treaty that "did not give sufficient assurance that its 
interests would be considered. Such interests are not 
adequately safeguarded in the United Nations, where even 
very small states such as mine [Malta] have the same legal 
weight as the great powers. 11 104 As Ambassador Moore has 
written, the lack of a guaranteed U.s. seat alone "would be 
a treaty stopper in the U. S . Senate and indeed ought to 
be." lOS 
D. The Review Conference 
Another area of Administration concern is the review 
process. 106 Fifteen years after the earliest commercial 
production began under an approved plan of work, the Assem-
bly would call a review conference. The Conference would 
consider, inter alia, whether the parallel system of exploi-
tation had "benefi tted mankind as a whole," whether the 
policies of the production controls had been fulfilled and 
whether the system had resulted "in the equitable sharing of 
104pardo, supra note 41, at 216. 
105 Moore, supra note 88, at 28. 
106Draft Convention, supra note 6, at Article 155. 
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benefits from activities in the area, taking into particular 
consideration the interests and needs of the developing 
states. 11 107 The Conference would also lIensure that the 
principles of the common heritage of mankind, the interna-
tional regime designed to ensure its equitable exploitation 
for the benefit of all countries, especially the developing 
States, and an Authority to conduct, organize and control 
activities in the area, [had been] maintained. 1I108 
The problem for this Administration is that the United 
states could, in the future, be bound by a treaty the Senate 
has never ratified. If, after fi ve years, the Conference 
were unable to reach agreement,· it could, by a two-thirds 
majority adopt amendments changing or modifying the system 
as it saw fit. These amendments would become binding upon 
all States if ratified by bwo-thirds of the parties. IIA 
simple two-thirds vote easily controlled by the Group of 77 
could easily rewrite the deep sea-bed mining text in any way 
desired and it would become binding on the united States 
wi th no recourse on our part except to drop out of the 
treaty altogether 11 109 At that point, State practice 
might have crystallized around the form of exploitation in 
the Convention so that international customary law no longer 
sanctioned unilateral exploitation. 110 In the opinion of 
107Id . at Article 155(1). 
108Id . at Article 155(2). 
109 Moore, supra note 88, at 28. 
110 Ely, supra note 79, at 24. 
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one former ambassador to the Conference, "to say that 'our 
vi tal interests are simply going to be put up for a two-
thirds vote at the end of a twenty-year period is absolutely 
wrong ... ,,111 
E. The Production Limitations 
Another part of the treaty particularly upsetting to 
the mining industry is Article 151 which would set ceilings 
on the amount of nickel which could be produced annually 
(and so the other metals as well). The ceiling would be 
designed to protect the export earnings of countries, usual-
ly less-developed, which rely on the export of a mineral 
also likely to be mined from the area. The amount of pro-
duction would be limited to the increase in the consumption 
of nickel. 
One problem with the complicated formula in the text is 
that it "is based on a projection forward of past trends 
[and so] it is impossible to predict exactly what level of 
production will be allowed during the fifteen years the 
limit will, in effect, apply. ,,112 For the miner investing 
the estimated ten million dollars simply to prospect a 
. I . . t 113 th d' f h h h s1ng e m1ne S1 e e unanswere quest10n 0 ow muc e 
would be allowed to produce would only increase his uncer 
111 Moore, supra note 88, at 28. 
112R' h d 48 ~c ar son, supra note , at 201. 
113Id . at 202. 
100 
______ " _______ ........... '401" .,.,,, .. ,,A.I&J ~" uvu.I'\.I, .. n"", 
tainties. 114 
On the posi ti ve side, a floor has been added which 
would lessen the impact of any fall in demand. l1S This 
floor sUbstitutes a 3 per cent growth rate for any rate 
which is actually lower. 
Article lSI has also been criticized for it would allow 
the Authority to join cartels to IIstabilize the market price 
for land -based producers. 11 116 Failing that, the Assembly 
could set up a system of compensation to aid developing 
countries suffering from a drop in export earnings as a 
result of sea-bed mining. 117 Industry sources fear that the 
end result of these provisions would be to eliminate lIany 
possibility of the u.s. achieving self-sufficiency in manga-
nese, nickel or cobalt. They would also artificially 
inflate the price U. s. consumers have to pay for sea-bed 
minerals, just as the production controls of OPEC have in-
114[Onej should not m~n~m~ze the potential hazards involved in 
the continuous operation of mine ships in the high seas with 
sophisticated equipment for gathering and lifting nodules 
from about 500 met res water depth. The vagaries of the 
weather at the surface, resistance of materials subject to 
the high pressures and corrosion of the water column, topo-
graphic hazards at the seafloor, the logistics of maintaining 
a large crew out at sea for an extended time, are some of the 
factors that will bear on the operational results of nodule 
mining once it starts on a commercial scale. It remains to 
be seen how attractive the economic returns of the industry 
will actually turn out to be. 
The Secretary-GeneralIs Report, supra note 16, at 26. 
115Draft Convention, supra note 6, at Article 151(2)(b)(iv). 
116GilliS, supra note 18, at 61. 
117Draft Convention, supra note 6, at Article 151(4). 
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flated the price of oil. 11 118 
F. The Lack of Judicial Review 
The Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber would be an integral part 
of the International Sea-Bed Authority and the regime of the 
area. In this connection, the Chamber would enjoy in addi-
tion to its contentious jurisdiction,119 an advisory juris-
diction at the request of the Assembly or of the Council. 12Q 
But the Chamber would have no jurisdiction with regard to 
the exercise by the Authority of its discretionary powers; 
in no case would it substitute its discretion for that of 
the Authority. The Chamber would be forbidden to decide 
whether any rules, regulations or procedures adopted by the 
Authority conformed to the provisions of the Convention; nor 
could it declare any such rules, regulations or procedures 
invalid. 121 
By exempting the International Sea-Bed Authority from 
judicial review, the Convention only increases the fears of 
the developed countries that lIonce constituted the Interna-
tional Sea-Bed Authority will become a leviathan, which 
shall chart its own unchecked course, to the severe detri-
118G· ll · 8 6 5 1 1S, supra note 1 ,at 1, footnote 3. 
119J . d' t' h' h . . d ur1S 1C 10n w 1C 1S exerC1se upon adversary or contentious 
(meaning opposed or litigated) proceedings. 
BLACK'S supra note 31, at 390. 
120Carnegie, The Law of the Sea Tribunal, 28 INT'L & COMPo L. Q. 669, 
681 (1979). 
121D f c· 6 A 1 ra t onvent10n, supra note ,at rtic e 190. 
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ment of the developed nations. 11122 
G. Resource Sharing with Liberation Movements 
Another rather peculiar provision could be interpreted 
as requiring the sharing of deep-sea resources with various 
liberation movements. One article would require that acti-
vities in the area be carried out for the benefit of mankind 
as a whole, "taking into particular consideration the inter-
ests and needs . . . of peoples who have not attained full 
independence or other self-governing status. 123 The unique 
situation could then arise where a signatory to the Conven-
tion had to share deep-sea resources (through the Authority) 
with an anti-government movement directed against it. The 
united States has specifically mentioned the Palestine 
Liberation Organization in this regard. 124 
IV. THE CASE AGAINST UNILATERAL· EXPLOITATION 
AND IN FAVOR OF A TREATY 
Despite these objections there are a number of reasons 
why a treaty is important to the united States. Al though 
the United States may legally begin unilateral exploitation, 
such a course of action would not be in the country's best 
interests. 
The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany 
122C 11' 2 676 o 1ns, supra note , at . 
123n £ C . ra t onvent1on, supra note 6, at Article 140. See Article 
160(2)(£). 
124THE BULLETIN, supra note 70, at 49. 
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have each enacted legislation which licenses their own na-
tionals to mine the sea-bed and which also recognizes the 
licenses of other nations. 125 The number of nations 
expected to pass similar legislation in the future is quite 
small, from six to eight at most. Such unilateral exploi-
tation and legislation would not guarantee a clear title 
whereas the Draft Convention IIwould obtain a good interna-
tional title, alongside good national title, to minerals 
extracted .. 11 126 Various legal challenges to unilater-
al exploitation can be envisioned which would disrupt mining 
by the developed nations and impede the flow of risk capital 
t .. . 127 o m1n1ng compan1es. 
125 See Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980, 30 U. S. C. 
§ 1401.---Title I of the Act deals with the regulation of exploration and 
commercial recovery activities by U.S. citizens, which include licensing 
procedures and environmental protection measures; Title II concerns the 
effect an internationally ratified treaty on the law of the sea would 
have on the Act; Title III deals with enforcement measures and penal-
ties; and Title IV deals with deep sea-bed hard mineral removal taxes. 
See also Arrow, The Proposed Regime for the Unilateral Exploitation of 
Deep Seabed Mineral Resources by United States, 21 HARV. J. INT'L L. 337 
(1980) . 
126Rosenne, Reflections on the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the 
Sea: Where It Stands in April, 1981, in PROCEEDINGS OF CONFERENCE ON 
DEEP SEABED MINING AND FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 1,14 (F. Chen ed. 1981). 
127The Group of 77 could bring suit in the national courts of the 
developed State sponsoring the mining company. The Group of 77 would 
claim its right, as members of the world community, to bring a class 
action suit on behalf of the common heritage of mankind, which was being 
wrongfully appropriated by the mining company. 
Alternatively, such a suit could challenge the exclusivity of the 
claim. Res nullius recognizes only a right to take possession on a 
first-come, first-served basis. It does not recognize the right to 
exclude others from the same area. If such a suit were successful and 
one or more less-developed nations began '!poaching" operations, the 
profitability of the original miner's venture would be gravely threa-
tened. 
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unilateral exploitation would also aggravate tensions 
which are already present between the United States and 
Third World countries. The possibility of achieving inter-
national agreements in other important areas such as the 
Antarctic, space, energy, food, other commodities and the 
environment would be greatly lessened. Moreover, the lack 
of progress at the Conference "could produce such a caustic 
atmosphere that constructive cooperation and trade between 
the united States and other nations in an interdependent 
world would be hampered. II12S 
A successful Conference on the other hand, would place 
very strong international emphasis on the rule of law. 129 
The members of -the Conference are "engaged in an effort to 
bring nations together around a common framework not only 
about what the law is, but also about procedures for resolv-
"130 ing disputes that may arise in the future. 
(footnote 127 continued) 
A different type of suit could be brought by an undeveloped coun-
try in its own courts. If the court found the mining operation to be 
illegal, it could then award damages to the country as its share of the 
plundered common heritage of mankind. The damages could be collected by 
expropriating other financial interests of the mining company in that 
country. 
See H.G. KNIGHT, CONSEQUENCES OF NON-AGREEMENT AT THE THIRD U.N. LAW OF 
THE SEA CONFERENCE, 34-35 (1976). 
128Charney, United States' Interests in a Convention on the Law of the 
Sea: The Case for Continued Efforts, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 39, 41 
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Charney]. 
129 Moore, supra note 88, at 24. 
l30Id . 
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Deep sea-bed issues are only a part of the Conference's 
work; the negotiations have included virtually every poss-
ible issue involving relations between nations with respect 
to the oceans, such as fishing, jurisdiction, navigation, 
environment and scientific research. 131 Parts of the Draft 
Convention are very favorable to united States' interests. 
The united states for example, has specific navigational 
interests protected by the enactment of a treaty which are 
particularly important. These include the freedom for SSBN 
nuclear submarines to travel submerged through straits used 
for international navigation, the ability of aircraft to 
have overflight of these straits and generally the right of 
commercial and military ships to travel the oceans freely.132 
As Ambassador Moore has noted133 there is a hint of a 
trade-off in obtaining these navigational rights in the 
Convention in return for restricting United states' freedom 
to exploit the sea-bed. Other comments taking the opposite 
view emphasize the importance of mining rights over these 
navigational freedoms. 134 The Draft Convention should not 
be signed simply because some united states' interests would 
be promoted. Navigational rights and assured access to the 
sea-bed are important and they should both be included in 
131 Charney, supra note 128, at 39. 
132 Moore, supra note 88, at 23-24. 
133Id . at 24. 
134ECKERT, supra note 13, at 281. 
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any treaty the united States signs.135 
Aside from the legal and political arguments in favor 
of a treaty, there are strong equitable considerations 
against unilateral exploitation. New sources of wealth, 
created by technological advances, should not be used to 
widen the already large gaps in wealth between the First and 
Third Worlds. 136 While states may have the legal right to 
res nullius, elements of equity should be introduced into 
the international legal system so that some of this pre-
viously unowned wealth reaches those countries with the 
greatest need. 137 
V. CONCLUSION 
The 150 nations at the Conference have much invested in 
a successful law of the sea treaty. While it is too soon to 
be able to predict a successful outcome, conference members 
have narrowed the areas of disagreement to those provisions 
relating to deep-sea mining. 
135 Moore, supra note 88, at 27. 
1360ne former U.S. Supreme Court Justice and U.N. Ambassador explains 
the equitable arguments of many Third World countries: "They do feel 
deeply that, particularly with respect to mineral ,and energy resources 
in their own countries, they were taken advantage of during the period 
of colonialism. And who can deny that this was the case? They do not 
want the seas similarly colonized. We should agree that they should not 
be." 
Goldberg, The State of the Negotiations on the Law of the Sea, 31 Hast-
ings L.J. 1091, 1095 (1980). 
137 See generallY, Franck, Kennedy & Trinko, A Equitable Regime for 
Seabed and Ocean Subsoil Resources, 4 DEN. J. INTtL L. & POLty 161 
(1974) . 
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The disagreement stems from two differing views on the 
legal status of these resources. The industrialized nations 
claim the right unilaterally to exploit the sea-bed as a 
tradi tional freedom of the high seas. The minerals, or 
nodulel, are ~ nullius which anyone may take. Less deve-
loped nations argue that the nodules are res communes or a 
part of the common heritage of mankind. As such, no one may 
legally commence mining operations absent a treaty, for to 
do so would constitute a theft of a portion of the common 
heritage. 
The Reagan Administration was greatly criticized by 
Third World nations for undertaking a policy review at such 
a late stage in the negotiations. Many doubted the new 
President's commitment to a law of the sea treaty and feared 
unilateral action on the part of the industrialized nations. 
While there are strong political and equitable arguments 
against unilateral exploitation, President Reagan has raised 
objections to the Draft Convention which, from the united 
states' viewpoint, must be clarified. 
The Group of 77 sought assured access through the 
international sea-bed regime: this has been achieved. It 
is not at all clear whether under some of the sea-bed mining 
articles the industrialized nations' access is as secure. 
At the heart of the Administration objections is the fear 
that Western access may be greatly limited. Any successful 
treaty must clarify the ambiguities surrounding this issue, 
or there will be no treaty. 
Roger Tansey Hertz 
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